The difficulties of refugee claim adjudication are well known. It can be extremely difficult to determine the veracity of a given claim, and the difficulty of structuring a fair claims process is itself significant. In this paper, working from within the Canadian context of refugee determination, we propose to examine an additional potential injustice associated with the claims process — the epistemic injustice done to an applicant who has little understanding of the claims process itself. We argue that such an applicant is subject to what philosopher Miranda Fricker calls “hermeneutical injustice” — an injustice due to the paucity of resources available to the subject to make sense of her experience. Being classed, or failing to be classed, as a refugee meriting asylum is a pivotal moment in a claimant’s life history. We argue that lacking access to resources necessary for understanding the basis of this determination amounts to a type of injustice, an injustice that is both epistemological and ethical.
|Keywords:||Epistemology, Self-understanding, Fricker, Hermeneutical Injustice, Refugees|
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Associate Professor, Centre for Global Studies, Huron University College, London, Ontario, Canada
There are currently no reviews of this product.Write a Review