This paper criticizes J.N. Findlay's "ontological disproof of the existence of God" but attempts to show what would be required to establish atheism's functional equivalent.
|Keywords:||God, necessarily existing being, atheism, J.N. Findlay, ontological disproof|
I was born in Kansas City, Missouri, and grew up in Leavenworth, Kansas. After graduating from the University of Kansas, I spent a year studying in the faculty of theology of the University of Marburg, Germany, on a Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst Award. I was also an instructor at Spelman College, Atlanta, Georgia. At Union Theological Seminary I did my M. Div. thesis on the views of Antony Flew and David Hume on religion. I did my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Minnesota on the concept of particularity in the philosophy of Gustav Bergmann. Presently, I am an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Geneseo. I am the editor of Classics of Analytical Metaphysics (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984) and the forthcoming anthology, Identity, Existence, and Knowledge: Essays on the Philosophy of Panayot Butchvarov (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005). I have published in Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics, Philosophy Research Archives, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, and elsewhere. I have written the entry on Herbert Hochberg in the forthcoming book, Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press).
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